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Introduction
Dietrich Bonhoeffer is remarkable for a variety of reasons; his Christology, biography,
ecclesiology, and originality draw people toward his life and theological writings. One of
Bonhoeffer’s most remarkable talents, however, is his ability to theologically use philosophy.
While Bonhoeffer demonstrated close familiarity and even reliance upon philosophers (e.g.,
Hegel, Leibniz, and Heidegger), he always exercised theological skepticism toward their
systems. Especially evident in Sactorum Communio, Bonhoeffer recognized certain
philosophical concepts to be helpful aids and instructional points for the Church; yet, these
lessons for Christianity are brought into full clarity only in relation to Christ. This paper will give
an account of Bonhoeffer’s (1) critique of philosophy and his (2) positive use of philosophy as a
creative tool for Christians—by articulating Bonhoeffer’s paradigmatic theological use of
philosophy, this essay also offers a viable position on the relationship between theology and
philosophy.
Bonhoeffer’s Critique of Enclosed Philosophical Systems
Beginning in Sanctorum Communio, Bonhoeffer’s first dissertation, and extending
through his other works (especially in Ethics), Bonhoeffer’s usage of philosophy demonstrates a
remarkable familiarity with the continental tradition. For example, Bonhoeffer spends time
discussing alternative philosophical accounts of personhood at the beginning of Sanctorum
Communio, and he concludes that they cannot offer a Christian paradigm for personhood, as they
either are too atomistic (e.g., Stoicism and Epicureanism) or subsume any “You” into the
subjective “I” (e.g., Cartesian and Kantian views).1 Bonhoeffer even uses Aristotelian logic to

1

Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio: A Theological Study of the Sociology of the Church, eds.
Clifford J. Green and Joachim Von Soosten, trans. Reinhard Krauss and Nancy Lukens (Vol. 1. Dietrich Bonhoeffer
Works. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2009), 36-46.

1

identify the categorical fallacy of deriving a concept of social personhood from epistemology.2
These examples give a small picture of Bonhoeffer’s creative use of philosophy. Alongside his
use of philosophy, however, he always includes a critique of philosophy.3 The following three
sections will explain a few of the primary reasons for Bonhoeffer’s theological critique of
philosophical systems.
The Myth of Neutrality
In Sanctorum Communio, before he enters into his analysis of the primal state of
humanity and community (i.e., the state of humanity before the fall),4 which heavily involves
social theory and philosophy, he argues that only from revelation are “social-philosophical”
discussions of the primal state helpful for a theological sociology of the Church.5 Bonhoeffer
explains, “Every aspect helpful to its [i.e., the primal state’s] comprehension is imparted through
revelation. Nothing about it can be ascertained by pure speculation. It cannot speak of the
essence of human being, of nature, or of history in general terms, but only in the context of

2
Bonhoeffer rejects basing personhood in epistemology because it is a μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος (i.e., a
change to a different category). Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio, 45.
3

This is evident from the beginning of Sancorum Communio. When discussing the Christian concept of the
human person, for example, Bonhoeffer writes, “For Christian philosophy, the human person originates only in
relation to the divine; the divine person transcends the human person . . . . Idealist individualism’s notion of spirit as
being-for-itself [Fürsichsein] is unchristian, as it involves attributing to the human spirit absolute value that can only
be ascribed to diving spirit.” Ibid., 49.
4
Discussing the primal state is significant because it is the first step in three states of salvation history that
Bonhoeffer discusses in Sanctorum Communio: primal state, fallen state, and reconciled state. Bonhoeffer explains
the significance of understanding each state. He writes, “The doctrine of the primal state is hope projected
backward. Its value is twofold. [1] It forces the methodological clarification of the structure of theology as a whole;
[2] then it renders concrete and vivid the real course of things from unity [i.e., the primal state] through break [i.e.,
the fallen state] to unity [i.e., the reconciled state]. Thus, the concepts of person and community, for example, are
understood only within an intrinsically broken history, as conveyed in the concepts of primal state, sin, and
reconciliation.” Thus, the topics of Bonhoeffer’s study (i.e., personhood, community, and the Church) are
understood only in the theological history of primal state, fallen state, and reconciled state. Ibid., 60-62. Michael
Mawson, “Theology and Social Theory—Reevaluating Bonhoeffer’s Approach,” Theology Today (71, no. 1 (April
2014): https://doi.org/10.1177/ 0040573613518549), 76.
5

Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio, 62-65.
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revelation that has been heard.”6 Bonhoeffer makes these nuanced claims because philosophy
tries to belong to the primal state alone; in other words, philosophy operates as if there has only
ever been a primal state of humanity that is untainted by sin. Yet, as Bonhoeffer observes, every
human being is marred by sin in their loves and knowledge—thus, there can be no neutral,
completely objective inquiry from philosophy.7
In Ethics, Bonhoeffer extends his critique of philosophical neutrality further, based on his
development of Christology. In his first chapter, “Christ, Reality, and Good,” he defines all of
reality as being the Christ-reality.8 There are not two realms of world and God; rather, world and
God are one in Christ, whose incarnation unites these two realities into one reality.9 Moving
himself away from the Lutheran doctrine of the two kingdoms, Bonhoeffer writes, “There are not
two realities, but only one reality, and that is God’s reality revealed in Christ in the reality of the
world.”10 Only in the Church, where the Christ-reality is fully realized, can a human be truly
human and have proper understanding.11 In this way, Bonhoeffer rejects any objective, neutral
attempt to understand reality. For instance, when discussing the Enlightenment and the French

6
7

Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio, 59-60.
Ibid., 64-65, 107-117.
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Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, eds. Ilse Tödt, Clifford J. Green, Ernst Feil, and Heinz Tödt, trans. Reinhard
Krauss, Charles C. West, and Douglas W. Stott (Vol. 6. Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress
Press, 2009), 58.
9
Bonhoeffer argues, “This thinking [i.e., understanding reality to be a duality of world and God] fails to
recognize the original unity of these opposites in the Christ-reality and, as an after-thought, replaces this with a
forced unity provided by a sacred or profane system [i.e., a philosophical system] that overarches them . . . . Things
work out quite differently when the reality of God and the reality of the world are recognized in Christ . . . . Just as
the reality of God has entered the reality of the world in Christ, what is Christian cannot be had otherwise than in
what is worldly, the ‘supernatural’ only in the natural, the holy only in the profane, the revelational only in the
rational.” Ibid., 59.
10

Ibid., 58.
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Ibid., 233, 242. Christiane Tietz, “Bonhoeffer on the Ontological Structure of the Church,” in Ontology
and Ethics: Bonhoeffer and Contemporary Scholarship, eds. Adam Clark and Michael Mawson (Eugene, OR:
Pickwick Publications, 2013), 44-46.
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Revolution, Bonhoeffer makes this very point, that every system of belief ultimately has a
religious basis. He writes, “The new unity that the French Revolution brought about in Europe,
and whose crisis we experience today, is Western godlessness . . . . It is not the theoretical denial
of the existence of God. Instead, it is itself religion, a religion of enmity toward God . . . . Its God
is the new human being.”12 For Bonhoeffer, even the most recent attempt (i.e., the
Enlightenment) at shaking humanity from its tradition and contingency ultimately fails to be
neutral and irreligious. Thus, in Sanctorum Communio and Ethics, Bonhoeffer gives theological
arguments for the impossibility of complete philosophical neutrality.13
Idolatrous Foundations
Bonhoeffer not only sees pure philosophy as problematic because it fails to meet its own
claims of neutrality, but he also critiques philosophy because of its idolatrous foundations. For
Bonhoeffer, Christ must always be Lord over any theoretical formulation—this places theology
in tension with much of philosophy, which becomes idolatrous in self-enclosed systems.
Bonhoeffer scholar Charles Marsh writes, “So sharp is Bonhoeffer’s suspicions of system, so
decisive is the preeminence of revelation, that not even the most rigorously critical philosophical
scheme can speak truthfully about meaning and existence on its own terms.”14 Even at the start

12

Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 122.

13
Barry Harvey, a Bonhoeffer Scholar, discusses this very theme of Bonhoeffer’s theology. Harvey argues
that postmodernism is an ally for Bonhoeffer’s theological pushback against modernism’s myth of neutrality.
Harvey writes, “Postmodern thought also reinforces something that Bonhoeffer emphasizes throughout his career,
beginning with Sanctorum Communio, which is that who we are as persons is not something that we are inwardly
and privately, which is the presumption of radical reflexivity. Who we are as individual persons is caught up in the
complex of power relations and interactions with others . . . . There is no safe haven of meaning, no substantial ‘self’
immune from the particularities of history and its contingent networks of power, no transcendental or idealist a
priori that supplies a foundational identity and purpose to our contingent existence.” Barry Harvey, Taking Hold of
the Real: Dietrich Bonhoeffer and the Profound Worldliness of Christianity (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2015),
116-117.
14

Charles Marsh, Reclaiming Dietrich Bonhoeffer: The Promise of His Theology (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1994), 58.
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of his academic career in Sanctorum Communio, Bonhoeffer eschewed the use of social
philosophy that relied on normative claims about reality; for theological reasons, Bonhoeffer
avoided the historical approaches of Weber and Troeltsch, preferring the older formal
approaches to sociology that did not import a unified account of reality into its findings.15 In
these ways, Bonhoeffer is skeptical of unified philosophical systems because they do not begin
with the revelation of Christ;16 without submitting to the revelatory lordship of Christ, these
philosophical systems inevitably become idolatrous.
The Christ-Reality
Behind his aversion to idolatrous philosophy and his critique of neutrality, Bonhoeffer’s
fundamental critique of philosophy is that it lacks Christology. True philosophy must be
animated by, focused on, and cognizant of the Christ-reality. Significantly, after claiming that the
ethical concept of the good is necessarily connected to human life (i.e., the good is not
abstractable, but always found in the concreteness of life),17 Bonhoeffer writes:
Ever since Jesus Christ said of himself, ‘I am the life’ (John 14:6; 11:27), no Christian
thinking or indeed philosophical reflection can any longer ignore this claim and the
reality it contains. This statement of Jesus about himself declares every attempt to
formulate the essence of life in itself as futile and doomed from the start . . . . We can
only live life, but not define it. The saying of Jesus binds every though about life to his
own person. I am the life. No question about life can reach behind this ‘I am.’ The
question of what life is changes here into the answer of who life is. Life is not a thing, an
essence, or a concept, but a person—more specifically, a particular and unique person

15

Mawson, “Theology and Social Theory—Reevaluating Bonhoeffer’s Approach,” 79.

16

Tietz, “Bonhoeffer on the Ontological Structure of the Church,” 35-37, 39-42.

17

Bonhoeffer argues, “We ask about the good not in abstraction from life, but precisely by immersing
ourselves in it. The question about the good is itself part of our life, just as our life is part of the question about the
good. The question about the good is asked and decided in the midst of a situation of our life that is both determined
in a particular way and yet still incomplete, unique and yet already in transition; it happens in the midst of our living
bonds to people, things, institutions, and powers, that is, in the midst of our historical existence. The question about
the good can no longer be separated from the question of life, of history.” Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 246-247.

5

. . . . Jesus posits this I in sharpest contrast to all thoughts, concepts, and approaches that
claim to capture the essence of life.18
In this passage, Bonhoeffer theologically explains why any claim made about the good must
position itself within the revelation of Christ, who is the good of life. Life is, in fact, held within
and originates from the person of Christ. This emphasis on the personhood of Christ reveals the
continual development of Bonhoeffer’s theology from Sanctorum Communio, in which
Bonhoeffer defines one of Christ’s modes of existence to be the Church-community—the living
body and ontological reality of Christ on earth.19 Accordingly, because all reality is held in
Christ,20 philosophy itself must be based on the Christ-reality, which is most intense within the
Church. This theoretical priority of Christ creates Bonhoeffer’s aversion to philosophical systems
that are self-enclosed. Yet, he still finds positive engagement with philosophy (more than many
theologians!) by Christologically redescribing philosophical concepts.

18

Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 249.

19

Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio, 140-141, 145-153, 182, 192-193.

20

Bonhoeffer’s definition of reality as the Christ-reality may sound strange to modern Christians, but
theologically, it is not a faulty position. Two theologians help elucidate this point. First, Charles Marsh addresses the
seeming monism of Bonhoeffer’s Christology, writing, “I take Bonhoeffer to be saying in Ethics that the Christian
message of reconciliation cannot help but speak of the redemption work of Christ in language that (at least initially)
sounds monistic.” This is the case because Christ has united the opposition of two spheres, the worldly and
transcendent. Bonhoeffer’s language, according to Marsh, derives from the apostle Paul and St. Irenaeus. Paul’s
language in Colossians and Ephesians as well as Irenaeus’ concept of divine recapitulation are likely influences on
Bonhoeffer. Marsh, Reclaiming Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 104. Second, Saint Athanasius’ Christology in On the
Incarnation offers an orthodox account similar to Bonhoeffers’ Christology. When discussing how humans can have
knowledge of God and the reasons for the incarnation, St. Athanasius writes, “But, what is most marvelous, being
the Word, he [i.e., Christ] was not contained by anyone, but rather himself contained everything. And, as being in all
creation, he is in essence outside everything by his own power, arranging everything, and unfolding his own
providence in everything to all things, and giving life to each thing and to all things together . . . . So also, being in
the human body, and himself giving it life, he properly gives life to the universe also.” In this and other passages in
On the Incarnation, Athanasius offers an inchoate form of Bonhoeffer’s claim that all of reality is contained in the
Christ-reality. Athanasius, On the Incarnation: Greek Original and English Translation, trans. John Behr (Yonkers,
NY: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2011), 85-87.

6

The Creativity of Philosophy
When reading Bonhoeffer’s books, the proceeding critique of philosophy stands out, but
Bonhoeffer’s frequent use of philosophy is also glaringly evident. He finds the truths of
revelation affirmed by certain philosophical views, yet, he always approaches philosophy from
theology. This section will outline some significant ways that Bonhoeffer theologically engages
with philosophy in his writings.
General Engagements with Philosophy in Santorum Communio and Ethics
Bonhoeffer’s opening to Sanctorum Communio reveals his interest in the creative insights
of social philosophy, which he uses in the service of theology. Bonhoeffer explains, “In order to
avoid misunderstandings, it should be noted that this study of the sanctorum communio does not
properly belong to the sociology of religion, but to theology. It will be carried out on the
foundation of Christian theology and will make fruitful for theology the fundamental insights
that derive purely from social philosophy and sociology.”21 Here, Bonhoeffer reveals his
paradigmatic view of theology and philosophy: theology should utilize the creativity of
philosophy, but only based on its own terms and doctrines. Moreover, Bonhoeffer adds to this
qualification that only those within the Church can understand the Sanctorum Communio.22
Nonetheless, he finds theological benefits by studying the Church “from two, or even three,
directions: theology, social philosophy, and sociology.”23 In this way, even in his early thought,
Bonhoeffer theologically utilized philosophy.

21

Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio, 31-32.

22

Ibid., 33.

23

Ibid., 33.
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While his stance toward philosophy is mostly critical in Ethics, Bonhoeffer does
recognize that so-called “worldly” developments within the unity of Christ24 are of great benefit
to the Church. He makes this point in reference to the political heritage of the West, not
specifically in reference to philosophy. Bonhoeffer writes, “Jesus Christ has made the West into
a historical unit . . . . The unity of the West is not an idea, but a historical reality whose only
foundation is Christ. The great intellectual movements from then on belong to the whole of the
West.”25 Here, Bonhoeffer is appreciating the historical flourishing that the Western world has
experienced due to Christ—both the political and the intellectual achievements have not been
realized based on purely human efforts. Rather, Western flourishing was only possible within the
unity of Christ, the assumed reality that Jesus is the preeminent Lord of all. This point relates to
philosophy because it demonstrates that Bonhoeffer considers certain “secular” developments in
history and philosophy to originate within the Christ-reality. Indeed, for Bonhoeffer, any
philosophy that operates based on the assumption that Christ is Lord and the regenerator of
creation can be a useful philosophy for the Church.
Kierkegaard
One example of such a Christological philosophy is found in Soren Kierkegaard, whose
influence is evident in Discipleship. Concerned about the privatized faith of Lutheran Christians
during his life, Bonhoeffer used Kierkegaard’s philosophy and interpretation of Luther in order

24

Bonhoeffer explains this unity as an agreement between communities that Christ is Lord of all and the
son of God in accordance with orthodox Christianity. He explains, “The unity of the West through the form of Christ
is the heritage that we have received from the early times of our history. Pope and emperor struggled over the
formation of this unity. Uncontested was Jesus Christ, the ultimate unity that stood above them both.” Bonhoeffer is
simply making the point that, for quite some time in history, there was a political unity in the reality of Christ. This
unity was unintentionally shattered by Martin Luther in the Reformation. Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 110-111.
25

Ibid., 109.
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to reaffirm costly grace and critique the prevalent acceptance of cheap grace.26 Theologian
Matthew Kirkpatrick details how Kierkegaard significantly impacted Bonhoeffer in the majority
of Bonhoeffer’s writings.27 Kirkpatrick helpfully explains:
Like Kierkegaard, Bonhoeffer sets up the dichotomy between the ethical principles of
systematic thought, and the obedience of the individual to God’s direct and momentary
commands. With this affirmation of the individual, the overcoming of the ethical
principles, and the absolute obedience to God, it can further be argued that the
teleological suspension of the ethical rests at the foundation of his [i.e., Bonhoeffer’s]
ethics—even his ‘communitarian’ ethic.28
In this passage, Kirkpatrick identifies just a few ways that Bonhoeffer utilized Kierkegaard’s
philosophy, which helped Bonhoeffer develop his own critique of ethical systems and his
understanding of simple-minded obedience to God.29 Relying on Kierkegaard’s Lutheranphilosophical development of faith and obedience, Bonhoeffer articulated a rich theology of
discipleship for his fellow Germans.30
Hegel
From Hegel, Bonhoeffer receives a more distinctly philosophical influence. Once again,
in Sanctorum Communio, Bonhoeffer reveals his method of theological critique and
Christological redescription when engaging with Hegel. Bonhoeffer Scholar Jeff Nowers

26

Geffrey Kelly and John Godsey, “Editors’ Introduction to the English Edition,” in Discipleship, eds.
Martin Kuske, Ilse Todt, Geffey Kelly, and John Godsey, trans. Barbara Green and Reinhard Krauss (Vol. 4.
Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2001), 10-16.
27
Matthew Kirkpatrick, “Bonhoeffer, Kierkegaard, and the Teleological Suspension of the Ethical: The
Beginning or End of Ethics?” in Ontology and Ethics: Bonhoeffer and Contemporary Scholarship, eds. Adam Clark
and Michael Mawson (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2013), 90-94.
28

Ibid., 94.

29

In a few passages in Discipleship, Bonhoeffer seems to theologically develop concepts that are very
similar to Kierkegaard’s own philosophy. Specifically, Bonhoeffer’s articulations of simple obedience and
Abraham’s individualist example of faith mirror Kierkegaard in Fear and Trembling. Dietrich Bonhoeffer,
Discipleship, eds. Martin Kuske, Ilse Todt, Geffey Kelly, and John Godsey, trans. Barbara Green and Reinhard
Krauss (Vol. 4. Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2001), 80-83, 96-99.
30

Ibid., 61-81.
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contends that Hegel’s concept of objective Geist may be the central focus of Sanctorum
Communio.31 Nowers explains how Hegel’s concept of historical Geist develops in three stages:
(1) subjective Geist (i.e., an individual’s consciousness), (2) objective Geist (i.e., collective,
social spirit), and (3) absolute Geist (i.e., movement into the disciplines of art and philosophy).32
Bonhoeffer primarily develops the second movement, objective Geist. Bonhoeffer utilizes
Hegel’s concept when explicating the reality of human community and the I-You relation;
Nowers comments, “Indeed, the I-You dialectic is constitutive of sociality, just as sociality is
presupposed in any I-You relation. For this reason, Bonhoeffer understands individual Geist and
objective Geist as correlative.”33 In other words, Bonhoeffer views personhood as being
dependent upon objective Geist—the social spirit (or perhaps social imaginary) of one’s
community. Bonhoeffer explains:
Objective spirit is thus to be regarded as the connection between historical and
communal meaning, between the temporal and spatial intentions of a community.
Objective spirit is will exerting itself effectively on the members of the community. It has
individual form. It leads an individual life ‘beyond’ the individual person, and yet it is
real only through them. The more alive the individual persons, the more powerful the
objective spirit. It interacts reciprocally with each individual and with them all. To
withdraw from it is to withdraw from the community.34
Here, Bonhoeffer is certainly relying upon Hegelian concepts, but in this passage, he is merely
establishing the primal state of humanity (i.e., the state prior to the fall). In Chapter four of
Sanctorum Communio (the next chapter), Bonhoeffer subjects Hegel’s objective spirit to
hamartiology. Bonhoeffer argues, “Whereas in the primal state the relation among human beings

31

Jeff Nowers, “Hegel, Bonhoeffer, and Objective Geist: An Architectonic Exegesis of Sanctorum
Communio,” in Ontology and Ethics: Bonhoeffer and Contemporary Scholarship, eds. Adam Clark and Michael
Mawson, (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2013), 48.
32

Ibid., 49.

33

Ibid., 53.

34

Bonhoeffer, Santorum Communio, 99-100.
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is one of giving, in the sinful state it is purely demanding . . . . With sin, ethical atomism enters
history. This applies essentially to the spirit-form. All natural forms of community remain, but
they are corrupt in their inmost core.”35 Once again, Bonhoeffer holds the doctrines of
Christianity to be the necessary interpretations of any philosophy. In conclusion, Charles Marsh
insightfully summarizes Bonhoeffer’s relation to Hegel, writing, “Bonhoeffer’s appropriation of
Hegelian themes is always one of creative and critical redescription in light of his Christological
axiom.”36
Leibniz
While Bonhoeffer is starkly influenced by Hegel in Sanctorum Communio, he also relies
on Leibniz’s monadic philosophy when establishing his social philosophy. After discussing the
concept of collective persons,37 Bonhoeffer nuances his position so that it does not fall into one
of the same problems that Hegel’s philosophy does: the subsuming of individuals into unity.
After affirming the necessary condition of a “net of sociality” that people depend upon,
Bonhoeffer writes, “Clearly, Leibniz’s image of the monad may serve to clarify these social
basic-relations. This is an image of individual beings who are completely self-contained . . . and
yet conceiving, mirroring, and individually shaping all of reality, and, in doing so, discovering
their being.”38 One of Bonhoeffer’s goals in this dissertation is to show the necessity of objective

35

Bonhoeffer, Santorum Communio, 108.

36

Marsh, Reclaiming Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 83.

37

Bonhoeffer writes, “We maintain that community can be interpreted as a collective person with the same
structure as the individual person. Since Plato, the tradition has been to think of community as a large-scale human
being . . . with the aim of completely subordinating the individual to the whole. This subordination must be rejected
as contrary to the equal weight of personal and social being . . . . A community is a concrete unity. Its members must
not be viewed as separate individuals, for the center of activity lies not in each member, but in all of them together.
This unity must be the starting point for a concept of community, for there is no way from the many to the one . . . .
[T]he person comes into being only when embedded in sociality, and the collective person comes into being together
with the individual person.” Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio, 77-78.
38

Ibid., 79.
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spirit for personhood while simultaneously holding to the non-subsumable nature of each
individual.39 Bonhoeffer, then, is seemingly placing Leibniz and Hegel in conversation in order
to produce a more balanced approach to personhood and social relations. While Leibniz may
seem like an unlikely aid in developing a sociology of the Church, it seems that Bonhoeffer
recognized in Leibniz’s monadic philosophy not an atomistic social theory,40 but a significant
way of conceiving the interconnectedness of humanity.41 Thus, just as he theologically utilizes
Hegel and Kierkegaard, Bonhoeffer theologically utilizes Leibniz’s philosophy in service to the
Church—a repeating feature in Bonhoeffer’s theology that will now be explicated.
Christological Redescription: A Model for Christian Philosophy
This articulation of Bonhoeffer’s paradigmatic use of philosophy will frame itself based
on two general steps: theological (1) antithesis and (2) affirmation. While Bonhoeffer’s
engagement with philosophy is multi-faceted, it can be understood generally in these two actions
of antithesis and affirmation. In addition, Bonhoeffer’s paradigm is not a full description of a
theology of philosophy; rather, his engagement with philosophy can offer some hints at the right
direction for a full description of philosophical theology. These following points are drawn from
the proceeding observations of Bonhoeffer’s theological use of philosophy.

39

Marsh, Reclaiming Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 67-71.

40

In yet another passage, Bonhoeffer discusses how the “monadic image of social life” gains its full
richness through the concept of collective persons—the unity of individuals. Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio,
103.
41
Leibniz’ concepts of (1) monadic folds (i.e., the process of monadic unfolding that realizes potentials
over time) and (2) the connectedness of the universe could be resources for some of Bonhoeffer’s concepts.
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, The Monadology, in Discourse on Metaphysics and Other Essays, eds. Daniel Garber
and Roger Ariew (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1991), 70, 73-75, 77. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Preface to the New
Essays, in Discourse on Metaphysics and Other Essays, eds. Daniel Garber and Roger Ariew (Indianapolis, IN:
Hackett, 1991), 54-55, 58, 64-65.
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Antithesis
First, Bonhoeffer seems to take a stance of antithesis when discussing philosophy. He
makes it clear that theology is his primary focus and locus from which he explores issues.
Sanctorum Communio exemplifies this point. Bonhoeffer begins by positioning his study in the
Church-community and within the discipline of theology.42 Furthermore, Bonhoeffer Scholar
Michael Mawson also observes that Bonhoeffer decides to engage with the older, formal
approach to sociology (e.g., Georg Simmel and Ferdinand Tönnies) rather than the newer,
historical approach because formal sociology intentionally worked to simply provide structural
observations of social entities, rather than a unified account of the world, which the historical
approaches of Weber, Durkheim, and Marx strive to do.43 In this way, Bonhoeffer’s early stance
in Sanctorum Communio demonstrates his initial antithesis toward enclosed philosophies that
attempt to make a unified account of existence. For Bonhoeffer, the “principal problem of
philosophy, then, involves its totalizing claims.”44 Accordingly, Bonhoeffer first extends critical
antithesis toward philosophy before affirming any of its claims.
Affirmation
After a critical evaluation of a philosophical position, however, Bonhoeffer happily
affirms its useful features in order to better display a theological reality. He appreciates the
energizing creativity that many philosophers offer. Marsh explains:
Bonhoeffer asserts that even though revelation demonstrates the insufficiency of all selfenclosed systems of thought, ontological and transcendental theses are not to be rejected
en masse without careful consideration . . . . [W]ithin the circumference of revelation’s
new social space—‘Christ existing as community’—certain contributions from ‘genuine’
transcendentalism and ontology are serviceable to theology. The important qualification
42
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is that in the course of theological redescription philosophical themes will no doubt be
construed in a ‘wholly new guise.’45
Indeed, Bonhoeffer found philosophy useful and a creative aid in theological arguments. Once a
philosophical position undergoes the critique of theology, its themes that find their ultimate
fulfilment in Christ can be included in theological doctrines. Sometimes, philosophy may even
make explicit the truths that are implicit in revelation. By practicing this form of theological
engagement, Bonhoeffer acknowledges the ability of non-Christian philosophers to formulate
genuine truth-claims that are in accord with revelation. In this manner, Bonhoeffer is not against
philosophy so much as he is for God’s revelation in Christ—as a Christian, Bonhoeffer
necessarily interprets philosophy theologically.
Christological Centering
This dialectic of antithesis and affirmation is established upon and extends from
Christology. Bonhoeffer understands his engagement with philosophy to be Christologically
based because (1) Christ contains all reality and (2) Christ engages with it from his communal
body, that is, the Church. When discussing modern philosophy of time, for example, Bonhoeffer
exemplifies his Christocentric theology. Harvey explains the Christ-centered emphasis in
Bonhoeffer’s theology: “The social technologies that reorganize time operate in stark contrast to
the way that divine revelation orders it withing the communion of the body of Christ. Revelation
is not limited to a record . . . . The church thus rightly perceives revelation in the form of the
present Christ, ‘Christ existing as community.”46 Within the Church, the past and future are
bridged—time is fully defined.47 Many other similar examples could be given, and they all
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describe Bonhoeffer’s Christological basis for theology. Only from the Christ-reality can
philosophy make meaningful claims.
Conclusion
When engaging a philosophical position, Bonhoeffer typically develops (1) a theological
critique and follows this critique with (2) an affirmation of the specific view’s creative features
that support theological insights. Such a paradigmatic engagement with philosophy from
theology can aid theologians today who may be confused by the interaction of these two
disciplines. With Christ at the center, theologians can wade into the complex dialogue between
theology and philosophy, a historically extended conversation to which each discipline must be
attuned. Following in Bonhoeffer’s footsteps, theologians can confidently and fruitfully interact
with philosophy.
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